Philosophical logic - Topics

Is the liar paradox a defect in our language or a genuine limit of truth? Teaching formal logic to students who have never written a proof How does modal logic separate necessity from apriority? What is the difference between logical consequence and derivability in a proof system? What does possible-worlds semantics actually explain about necessity? What makes epistemology a separate branch from logic when both study inference? Why do counterfactuals with false antecedents resist a truth value? Why specialist societies for logic and for ethics barely talk to each other What is the difference between a noema and the object it seems to present? When should a philosopher build a formal model instead of arguing in prose? Why is the existential quantifier so hard to render in ordinary speech? Is logic a branch of philosophy or a separate discipline that left home? Why does material implication make if-then sound wrong in ordinary conditionals? Does second-order quantification commit you to more entities than first-order? What does the turnstile do that the conditional cannot? Why is identity inside a modal context called opaque? What does a free logic do about names that fail to refer? How did Frege and Russell turn symbolic logic into the working tool of a whole tradition? How do paraconsistent logics tolerate a contradiction without exploding into everything? Is modal realism the hidden price of possible-worlds semantics? How do relevance logics block the paradoxes of entailment? Why do analytic philosophers translate ordinary claims into formal notation before trusting them? Possible worlds and whether they are anything more than a logical device The metaphysics of modality and what could not have been otherwise Is truth a property of sentences or of the world?