Philosophy of science - Category Home
Philosophy of science - Topics
Experimental philosophy and natural philosophy meant different things to the people who used the terms
Cladistics vs phenetics: what counts as a natural group
Empiricism versus rationalism: is reason or experience the source of knowledge?
How a scientific dispute gets closed depends as much on institutions as on the data
The conflict thesis in history and why historians reject it
Why the history of science stopped being a list of geniuses and became a study of institutions
Whether miracle claims can be tested scientifically
Do experiments discover or only test what theory already predicted?
The role of experience in knowledge: a very old argument that never ended
Why calling evolution just a theory misunderstands the scientific use of the word
Why the multiverse remains outside the reach of testable science
Buddhist and Hindu approaches to cosmology and modern physics
Evidence hierarchies differ by field: what counts as proof in medicine vs ecology
Reproducibility and generalizability pull in opposite directions
The line between fringe and revolutionary is only obvious after the fact and that is the problem
Where do the limits of empirical measurement sit?
Do physical laws have exceptions or are they applied outside their domain?
How does experimental science differ from observational and theoretical science?
The mechanical philosophy replaced Aristotelian causes and made clockwork the metaphor of choice
Would we even recognize alien life if it were right in front of us?
Does empirical evidence accumulate into theory or just pile up?
The second law of thermodynamics and why entropy gives time a direction
The clockwork universe metaphor shaped what counted as an explanation for two centuries
Why some disciplines treat their founders as authorities long after they were wrong
String theory after fifty years without a testable prediction
Does qualitative research belong in the natural sciences?
Where hypotheses come from: observation first or theory first?
Why some fields resist becoming experimental at all
Locke and Hume on where our ideas actually come from
Why two theories can fit the same data and only one survive
Is a model a claim about the world or a useful stand-in
Can a science be experimental without being manipulable?